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NOTE AND COMMENT
convicted of second degree murder only, it follows that
the jury must have concluded that there was no delibera-
tion, and hence he was not prejudiced by the court's in-
struction even though it be assumed that it was errone-
ous. "
It is to be noted that none of the Montana cases quoted above
could be construed as supporting the proposition that premedi-
tation and deliberation could be formed in the moment or instant
before the act is executed even though Territory v. Johnson and
State v. Spotted Hawk lean in that direction. State v. Shafer
and State v. LeDuc reflect an attitude in opposition to the "mo-
ment or instant" doctrine.
In summation it may be said that the court in the Cates case
enunciated a rule, in attempting to delimit premeditation and
deliberation as elements in first degree murder, which is not in
keeping with legislative intent or prior decisions nor with the
trend of decisions in other jurisdictions. The inference which
must be drawn from this decision is inconsistent and incom-
patible with the connotation of the words in question. Any at-
tempt to define "deliberate and premeditated" in terms of
"moment or instant" must of necessity be erroneous and more
in keeping with the antonyms of these words and must inevita-
bly obscure or eliminate the distinction between first and second
degree murder."
MALCOLM MAcCALMAN.
"For persuasive authority in support of the view expressed herein, it is
recommended that reference be made to Judge Pope's decision (note 9
supra) which is the leading and most recent case on this matter in the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The opinion is very effectively
presented and is supplemented with ample footnotes and citations.
People v. Bender and People v. Hashaway (note 8 supra) are also
effective.
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IN TRESPASS ACTIONS WHEN
TITLE IS IN DISPUTE
The purpose of this article is to state the position of the
Montana Supreme Court on the question of whether or not a
court of equity will grant injunctions to enjoin trespasses to land
in cases of disputed title or right before determination of the
title or right in an action at law.
Until very recently courts have refused to enjoin a trepass
of any kind on real estate where it appeared from the pleadings
that the title to the land was in controversy. Three of the rea-
sons that appear most frequently in the decisions are: (1) It was
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up to a court of law rather than a court of equity to determine
and adjust titles to disputed property; (2) A party should
not be deprived of a trial by jury on such matter; and, (3) The
court of equity was unwilling to use the injunction to take prop-
erty out of the possession of one party and put it into the hands
of another whose rights had not been established at law.'
However, the mere existence of doubt as to the title does
not in itself constitute a sufficient ground for denying an in-
junction, and, where title is admitted or established at law, its
owner will, in a proper case, be entitled to an injunction against
trespasses upon the property to which it relates.
The first case involving the question of disputed title in
relation to the issuance of an injunction is the 1920 decision of
Blinn v. Hutterische Society of Wolf Creek.' Plaintiffs were pur-
chasers of land under a contract of sale and the defendants were
the vendors. A lease was also embodied in the contract allowing
vendors to remain in possession of a part of the land but nothing
was said as to which party was entitled to the growing crops.
An injunction was issued to the plaintiffs restraining the de-
fendants, their agents and employees from entering upon the
lands described in their complaint, and from harvesting, thresh-
ing, or removing crops of fall wheat and rye, and from inter-
fering in any manner with the plaintiffs in their use and oc-
cupation of the lands. Immediately upon the service of the in-
junction the defendants appeared specially and moved that the
court dissolve the injunction. A hearing was had at which docu-
mentary evidence and oral testimony was introduced by the re-
spective parties, and, at the conclusion, an order was entered by
the court dissolving the injunction. On appeal the Montana
Supreme Court said: ". . . The society, the vendor, was in actual
and exclusive possession when it planted the crops in controversy
and continued in possession of the land upon which those crops
were growing until the injunction was issued and served. The
practical effect of the injunction as issued was to oust the society
from its possession and install the plaintiffs in possession, and
for such a purpose an injunction is not an available remedy."
The court quoted with approval United States Supreme Court
cases! which adhered to the theory that it was up to a court of
1Atkinson v. J. R. Croive Coal & Min. Co. (1909) 80 Kan. 161, 102 P.
50, 39 L.R.A. (NS) 31.
'Lacassagne v. Chapuis (1892) 144 U.S. 119.
1(1933) 94 Mont. 79, 21 P. (2d) 53, 92 A.L.R. 571.
'(1920) 58 Mont. 542, 194 P. 140.
'Lacassagne v. Chapuis (1892) 144 U.S. 119; Black v. Jackson (1900)
177 U.S. 349.
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law rather than a court of equity to determine and adjust titles
to disputed property.
In National Bank of Montana v. Bingham' a suit was
brought for the foreclosure of a mortgage on real estate. The
appeal is from an order of the district court refusing to grant
an injunction pendente lite in favor of Minnie H. Bingham,
a defendant, and against the plaintiff and Richard Manger and
Clara Manger, the other defendants. In this case the mortgagee
held a mortgage that covered two adjoining tracts of land separ-
ately owned by husband and wife. He proceeded to foreclose as
to the land owned by the latter only, having purchased the hus-
band's land at bankruptcy sale. The court denied defendant an
injunction pendente lite to restrain plaintiff from interfering
with the wife's possession of land formerly owned by the hus-
band saying: "Minnie H. Bingham claims now to have some in-
terest in the Frank R. Bingham land and claims the bankruptcy
sale thereof was void. Those claims can be tested in a suit by
her to quiet title. Title to or right of possession of real estate is
not triable by injunction, (Blinn v. Hutterishe Society, 58 Mont.
542, 194 Pac. 140), and injunction is not a proper remedy for
trespass on real estate unless the trespass be accompanied by in-
jury which is irreparable or is in the nature of waste and goes
to the destruction of the estate."'
The case of Union Central Life Insurance Co. v. Audit' was
an action by the vendor of farm lands seeking inter alia an in-
junction to restrain interference with his possession of the
premises by the vendee. The contract of sale had provided that
upon default in any particular by the vendee, possession should
be surrendered to the vendor. The court held that a purchaser
of lands who stipulates in his contract that on default of pay-
ments due the vendor may retake possession, is no longer right-
fully in possession after such default and demand therefore by
the vendor, but occupies the position of a trespasser. The ques-
tion then arose when will a court sitting in equity grant an in.
junction to a vendor against repeated trespasses by vendee in
default under a land contract? The court issued the injunction
and speaking through Chief Justice Callaway, said: "The gen-
eral rule is that a court of equity will not exert its power to en-
join a trespass when there is an adequate remedy at law. . ..
It will not enjoin a mere trespass.... "
"It is the rule also that 'title to or right of possession of
6(1928) 83 Mont. 21, 269 P. 162.
'King v. Mullins (1903) 27 Mont. 364, 71 P. 155.
"Supra, note 3.
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real estate is not triable by injunction.' (Lacassagne v. Chapuis,
44 U.S. 119, 12 Sup. Ct. 659, 36 L. Ed. 368; Blinn v. Hutterische
Society of Wolf Creek, 58 Mont. 542, 194 Pac. 140.) Neverthe-
less relief will be granted by injunction to protect the owner of
land whose right to possession is unquestioned 'against a repeti-
tion of wanton trespasses for which adequate compensation can-
not be given by way of damages.' The mere existence of doubt
as to the title does not of itself constitute a sufficient ground
for refusing an injunction.'"
By way of dictum, the language used would lead one to be-
lieve that the court was swinging around to the more enlightened
view, that is, although a court of equity may withhold its in-
junctive relief to prevent trespasses where the title or property
right is in dispute, it is not bound by an invariable and absolute
rule in the matter, but, as in other cases of injunction, should
exercise a sound judicial discretion with respect thereto.' In
fact, the rule should be one of discretion rather than one of jur-
isdiction.
The Montana court as yet, has not seen its way clear to swing
over to this view which seems to be the better on principle. There
is no good reason for equity courts not taking jurisdiction and
settling the property rights along with other problems.
To illustrate further, let us examine the action to quiet title
to property. It is accepted throughout the profession that an
action to quiet title is a remedy or a form of proceeding originat-
ing in equity jurisprudence,' the purpose of which is an ad-
judication of a claim of title to, or an interest in, property ad-
verse to that of the complainant as invalid, so that the complain-
ant and those claiming under him may lie forever afterward free
from any danger of the hostile claim. In many of the states,
of which Montana is one, statutes have been enacted which great-
ly enlarge the jurisdiction of the courts of equity in actions to
remove clouds or to quiet title, and generally permit an action
to be brought to determine any adverse claim, interest, or estate
in lands.' Such statutes are designed to afford an easy and ex-
peditious mode of quieting title to real estate.
The earliest Montana case on the question of whether the
equity court had jurisdiction to quiet title without first having
the legal title tried at law was Gallagher v. Basey.' This was an
9Boud v. Desrozier (1898) 20 Mont. 444, 52 P. 53.
"Wheelock v. Noonan (1888) 108 N.Y. 179, 15 N.E. 67, 2 Am. St. Rep.
405.
nBowen v. Chase (1876) 94 U.S. 184.
1 R.C.M. 1947, § 93-6203 (9479).
3(1868) 1 Mont. 457.
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action for a perpetual injunction to restrain the diversion of
water. The action was sustained though it did not appear that
the legal title had ever been tried in an action at law. It was
also held that the defendants were not entitled to a trial by jury.
The court proceeded upon the theory that its equity jurisdiction
having been invoked for injunctive relief, it could determine the
question of title involved in the first instance, though it was di-
rectly put in issue and though it is the rule that a court of
equity does not usually interfere in such cases until the title has
been established by an action for damages. This case was af-
firmed by the United States Supreme Court which held that
though the statute of the territory regulating civil proceedings
declared "that an issue of fact shall be tried by a jury unless a
jury trial be waived,"" a court sitting as a court of equity was
not bound by the findings of a jury upon the issues submitted
at the trial."
Fabian v. Collins' was another case of the same character,
and yet the territorial court expressly held that a trial by jury
could not be demanded as a matter of right and cited Gallagher
v. Basey, supra, with approval.
The case of Wolverton v. Nichols" was an action to deter-
mine an adverse claim to a mine in pursuance of the provisions
of Section 2326 of the Revised Statutes of the United States."
The Supreme Court held that the action was one in equity to
quiet title and should be so treated.
Milligan v. Savery" was a similar action and although the
case went off upon a motion for nonsuit, as did also Wolverton
v. Nichols, supra, the latter case was cited and the conclusions
therein announced were approved.
The case of Mantle v. Noyes' was an action under the
statute' to determine conflicting claims to real estate between
the patentees of a placer mine and the locators of a quartz lode.
The fundamental question at issue, as in the other cases cited,
was the legal title to the property in controversy; and yet, it
was expressly decided that the issue of fact presented was to be
finally determined by the court, and that a jury could not, as a
matter of right, be demanded by either of the parties, and the
'Laws of Montana-Codified Statutes 1871-1872, § 190.
"Basey v. Gallagher (1868) 87 U.S. 452.
"1(1877) 3 Mont. 215.
"(1883) 5 Mont. 89, 2 P. 308.
"U.S. Comp. St., p. 1430 (1901).
"(1886) 6 Mont. 129, 9 P. 894.
"(1883) 5 Mont. 274, 5 P. 856.
"Rev. Stat. § 2333.
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case of Gallagher v. Basey, supra, was considered at some length
and expressly approved.
In all these cases the main issue involved was the question
of legal title, and yet the court proceeded as in equity and not
at law, and determined it without the aid of a jury, or, if a jury
was called, its findings were regarded as advisory only.
This was the condition of the law on this subject at the time
the State Constitution was devised by the convention and
adopted by the people of Montana. Since that time all of these
cases have been repeatedly cited and approved.'
The Supreme Court of Montana has followed the rule laid
down in the majority of jurisdictions whereby a court of equity
will refuse to grant an injunction to restrain a trespass to real
estate in all cases where the title or right to land is in dispute.
The trial of an issue of legal title to land is in no essential re-
spect different from the trial of any other issue as to the exist-
ence of legal rights to chattels, contracts, or assignments in
which the existence or non-existence of such rights must be de-
termined in order to decide the case. No apparent reason exists
for the rule that questions of legal title to land must first be
settled in a law court. It is interesting to note in quiet title
actions that the reasons advanced for first trying the legal title
in a law court were raised to try and prevent the equity court
from assuming jurisdiction. These objections were met and dis-
posed of by the court as pointed out in the cases cited. So from
quiet title actions the court could borrow its reasoning by
analogy and assume jurisdiction in the first instance in the is-
suance of injunctions even though the title to the land is in
dispute. In Montana where law and equity are merged, there
is no possible place for the rule the court follows as to injunc-
tions in disputed title cases. This was the very thing the code
sought to prevent. As the rule stands today, the plaintiff must
bring two distinct and separate actions in trespass cases, one at
law to settle the disputed title, and the other in equity for an
injunction. The better rule would be for a single action to de-
termine all the issues in controversy and the question of disputed
title would be but another fact upon which the case would turn.
VERNE L. OLIVER.
11889.
'Larson v. Peppard (1909) 38 Mont. 128, 99 P. 136; Northern Pacific
Ry. Co. v. Hausworth (1914) 49 Mont. 135, 140 P. 516; Dipple v. Ne-
ville et al. (1928) 82 Mont. 280, 267 P. 214.
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